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Abstract. The right to practice religion is recognised as one of the universal liberties transitional 
justice interventions are designed to defend, and religion is often mentioned as one of the cultural 
factors that impact on local transitional justice practices from below. Many human rights cases of 
abuse, however, are motivated by religious extremism and the association of religion with con?lict 
has largely a discouraged re?lection on its positive contribution to transitional justice. This ?ield is 
undeveloped and the little work that elaborates 
its positive role is descriptive. This paper theorises 
the relationship between religion and transitional 
justice and develops a model for understanding its 
potential role that better allows an assessment of 
its strengths and weaknesses. The model is applied 
to original research conducted on ex-combatants 
in Northern Ireland, and concludes that only in 
very limited circumstances can religious actors 
make a telling contribution to transitional justice. 
Understanding what these circumstances are is 
the purpose of the model developed here. 
Keywords: Religion, Northern Ireland, Local 
Transitional Justice, Ex-combatants.
Introduction
Transitional justice is an interdiscipli-
nary ϐield. It has expanded its focus from 
the criminal processing of conϐlict-related 
crimes to the management of change after 
conϐlict and now shares its concerns with 
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disciplines like theology, religious studies and moral philosophy. Religious perspectives 
are posing a serious challenge to the human rights tradition that normally validates 
transitional justice studies, for religion can be one of the principal causes of the very 
conϐlicts transitional societies are recovering from and religious extremism poses one 
of the most serious threats to human rights. However, the relationship between religion 
and human rights is ambivalent. While most world religions have been active in struggles 
for universal human rights, they have also supported violence and repression. It is for 
reasons of such ambivalence that transitional justice scholars tend to ignore the contri-
bution of religion as a resource in transitional justice practice and interventions, which 
explains why religion, when it intrudes in the intellectual ϐield, does so in limited ways. 
This paper ϐirst reviews some of the forms in which religion enters transitional justice 
studies. It locates this literature within broader intellectual currents that are themselves 
structurally determined by changes in that ϐield. It discusses some of the limitations 
in this literature, the most signiϐicant of which is its inadequate conceptual mapping. 
This is used as the starting point for the formulation of a theoretical model which is 
proposed as one way to conceptualise the contribution of religion to transitional justice, 
drawing attention also the limitations of religion in the transitional justice ϐield. The 
model is applied to Northern Ireland as a case study, based on a study of religion and 
ex-combatants. In the next section, the paper addresses the highly constrained ways 
in which religion enters transitional justice studies.
The discovery of religion
There are two forms in which religion has penetrated transitional justice studies, which 
we call the neutral and the programmatic approaches. In the former, religion is inci-
dental; in the latter it is fundamental. The neutral version comes in two types, referred 
to here as passive and active. 
Dealing with its passive type ϐirst, the chief hallmark is that religion is coincidental 
to transitional justice, a random feature of the external environment that transitional 
justice practitioners have to negotiate in developing local interventions and practices. 
Universal declarations of people’s human right always mention the importance of the 
liberty to practice religious rights, although transitional societies often ϐind this right 
threatened or difϐicult to re-establish in the process of change see (Anderson, 2003). 
In practising this right, of course, transitional justice researchers recognise that reli-
gion is one of the contextual factors that affect local transitional justice interventions, 
sometimes facilitating, sometimes inhibiting bottom-up transitional justice. It does so, 
however, with no special status beside the whole array of other cultural processes that 
impinge on local transitional justice practices, such as gender, politics, history, and the 
like. Good examples are bottom-up transitional justice in Afghanistan (see Rubin, 2003), 
Sierra Leone (see Millar, 2010, 2011a, 2011b), Uganda (see Jackson, 2009), and Nepal 
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(see Robins, 2012), amongst others. Interestingly, religion has not been identiϐied as 
a contextual factor explicitly structuring bottom-up transitional justice in Northern 
Ireland, where Lundy’s work has almost pioneered the idea of local transitional practices 
(for example, 2011). In work such as this, religion is passive, one part of the environment 
that transitional justice practices have to negotiate, giving no meaning to these practices. 
In other studies of transitional justice, religion is an active process that does affect the 
goals of the intervention and practice, sometimes to advantage, sometimes for ill. For 
example, Igreja (2012) has documented the positive role of indigenous religious tradi-
tions in healing practices in post-conϐlict Mozambique. On the other hand, Boesenecker 
and Vinjanmuri (2011; also see Vinjanmuri and Boesenecker, 2009) have shown how 
in the mediation of international human rights norms, some faith-based NGOs can lose 
sight of them in their translation to local circumstances, and others promote them. 
The contribution of religion to truth recovery has been widely used to illustrate the 
active role of religion and studies have shown its unevenness. Wilson’s (2001, p. 134) 
account of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, for example, points 
to the constructive role played by religious actors, arguing that religious groups and 
the churches in the Vaal region were the only local organisations explicitly working 
with the Commission towards the goal of reconciliation. To Brudholm (2008), however, 
the religious ethos given to the evidential process by the Chair, Archbishop Tutu, con-
strained victims’ expressions of righteous anger, claiming that most felt themselves to 
be under a religious obligation to express forgiveness and purposely shoe-horned into 
doing so, by the way, their testimony was elicited, often through impromptu interven-
tions by the Chair in requesting it. Both views can be right at the same time because 
of the markedly different form that the religious interventions took, which only high-
lights the importance of conceptual mapping when identifying the role religion plays 
in transitional justice. 
However, to this neutral approach must be added another, which we call the program-
matic approach. The programmatic approach is partisan when championing the positive 
contribution of religion to transitional justice and much more systematic in identifying 
the range of interventions and practices it can inϐluence for the good. It is this approach 
that we wish to emphasise, for it reϐlects some fundamental realignments in the intel-
lectual ϐield that are themselves explicable by structural shifts in the conditions that 
produce these ideas. 
There is a growing international literature on the positive role of religion in transi-
tional justice that suits its characterisation as programmatic and agenda-setting. It 
ϐits, however, within a much broader intellectual shift, the emergence of a wider ϐield 
called religious peacebuilding. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is perhaps 
the intellectual leader of this trend, producing from its religion and peacebuilding re-
search programme, which began in the late 1990s, a body of literature (as an example 
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see the work of David Smock, 2001, 2002, 2006, 2008). This has been referred to by 
various names, ‘religious peacebuilding’, ‘religious conϐlict transformation’, ‘religious 
conϐlict resolution’ and ‘faith-based diplomacy’ (see Coward and Smith, 2004; Shore, 
2009; Schlack, 2009). 
This work endorses the earlier arguments of Johnston (2003) on faith-based inter-
ventions in conϐlict, suggesting that religion can be a particularly signiϐicant factor in 
peace when one of more parties to the conϐlict has strong religious identities and when 
religious leaders come from all sides of the dispute. In earlier work Smock (2001) 
listed several key roles for faith-based NGOs in peace processes, amongst them train-
ing, mediation, conϐlict prevention, dialogue, and reconciliation. While this work has 
been criticised for its optimism, much of the challenge is designed to improve rather 
than impugn the idea of religious peacebuilding. Brewer, Higgins and Teeney (2010, 
pp. 1019-37; also 2011), for example, dispute that these claims apply where religion 
is involved in the contestation or elides with ethnicity, ‘race’ and structural cleavages, 
when churches take sides and associate with speciϐic parties to the conϐlict and form 
part of regressive civil society, or where churches and para-church organisations uphold 
failed or failing states, but they nonetheless use these criticisms to try to advance the 
theorisation of religious peacebuilding.
The initial impetus to this literature came from North America, although there are some 
notable exceptions to US dominance of the ϐield. Shore (2009), for example, addresses 
South Africa, Brewer, Higgins and Teeney Northern Ireland (2011), and Durward and 
Marsden (2009) collated a series of talks given in November 2007 at the UK Royal 
Military Academy in Sandhurst on ‘engaging with religion for building peace’. But it is 
no coincidence that the stimulus to religious interventions in peacebuilding came from 
the cultural and political space of North America, for it is a post-Cold War phenomenon. 
The interest in the USA in religious peacebuilding is associated with the ‘end of history’ 
arguments that emerged at the fall of communism, and are about the universalisation 
of Western democracy as the ϐinal form of government. Religion, however, was drawn 
on as a resource for other reasons than the particular personal religious beliefs of neo-
conservatives who advanced these claims to hegemony. There is a plurality of religions 
in the USA as part of its racial and ethnic mix, and the country has never witnessed 
religious or holy war and thus has no historical memory of religious hatred and vio-
lence of the kind that negatively affects the idea of public religion in most of Europe. Its 
separation of church and state ensures no one religion has become the established faith 
and accorded privileged political status as a result. It is also a society where religious 
practice remains high, against the trend toward secularisation elsewhere in the West, 
which encourages the US to take religion seriously. 
What is more, the increasing importance of religion in post-Cold War conϐlicts, most 
notably in the Balkans but also more widely in the emergence of militant Islam, began to 
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affect US foreign and domestic policy interests in the late 1990s to the point where the 
focus on religion as a site for reconciliation became the reverse face of the attention on 
religion as a site of contestation. This is captured wonderfully in the title of a pioneering 
text in this genre by Scott Appleby (2000) when he referred at the beginning of the new 
millennium to The Ambivalence of the Sacred, its capacity for peacemaking within the 
midst of its warmongering. The language used by advocates of religious peacebuilding 
mirrored that of the religious extremists they wished to counter, referring to ‘religious 
militants for peace’ (see, for example, Appleby, 1998). Religious peacebuilding thus 
became part of the US interest in procuring global political stability. 
The repositioning of research focus to address this need has been dramatic. The USIP 
is not alone in establishing a research programme on religious peacebuilding; so did 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The US Institute for Global 
Engagement established a ‘religion and security’ initiative in 2003 designed to explore 
the intersection between religion and political stability, and Harvard University a ‘reli-
gion in global politics’ project. The American University in Washington DC, for example, 
has a large research programme funded by the Henry Luce Foundation on religious 
responses to violence; the same funder had earlier ϐinanced a seven-country study of 
grassroots religious peacebuilding lead by a team from Maryknoll Seminary in New York 
State (see Cejka and Bamat, 2003). New journals began to appear, such as The Review 
of Faith and International Affairs in 2002, and research centres and institutes sprang 
up to capture the zeitgeist, whose personnel have published many of the leading texts. 
Three can be mentioned for illustration. The Center for World Religions, Diplomacy 
and Conϐlict Resolution at George Mason University in Washington DC, is run by Marc 
Gopin, an expert on the role that religion and culture play in conϐlicts and conϐlict 
resolution, particularly in the Middle East (for a selection of Gopin’s work see Gopin, 
2000, 2002, 2012). The International Peace and Conϐlict Reconciliation Program at the 
American University in Washington DC is led by Professor Mohammed Abu-Nimer, an 
international expert on interfaith dialogue and Muslim contributions to conϐlict reso-
lution (for example, Abu-Nimer, 2003, Abu-Nimer and Augsburger, 2009). The Yale 
Center for Faith and Culture is directed by Professor Miroslav Volf, Henry B. Wright 
Professor of Theology at Yale Divinity School and author of several pioneering works 
on faith and the problems of reconciliation following mass violence, especially in the 
Balkans (see Volf, 1996, 2006). It is no coincidence therefore that personal religiosity 
and professional practice elide in some of the most well-known contributors, as their 
private faith motivates their research agenda. Some of these major texts are thus writ-
ten from a standpoint of deep religious belief. One of the ϐirst discussions of ‘political 
forgiveness’ was written by a theologian (Shriver, 2009; also see Torrance, 2006; Volf, 
2006), and some of the social science attempts to debate forgiveness are written from 
a Christian perspective (Amstutz, 2004), or use speciϐic scriptural texts to ϐlesh out the 
meaning of political forgiveness (Satha-Anand, 2002). 
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For the purposes of this paper it is signiϐicant that a further realignment in the intellec-
tual landscape arose when religious peacebuilding was extended to an interest in reli-
gious contributions to transitional justice, and time has been spent in locating this trend 
in the emergence of the wider ϐield of religious peacebuilding so that its cultural and 
political milieu can be understood. To reϐlect this shift, the US Social Science Research 
Council formed a working group on religion, reconciliation and transitional justice, and 
the famous Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University a 
restorative justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding initiative. There are many ways in 
which this new trend in transitional justice studies is manifest: work on the religious 
roots to restorative justice (for example, Hadley, 2001; Philpott, 2012), attention to the 
contribution of religion to truth recovery and memory (for example, Hayes and Tombs, 
2001), its role in managing the aftermath of violence and mass atrocity (Brudholm and 
Cushman, 2009), as well as many works of advocacy, the best example of which is the 
pioneering writings of Daniel Philpott, who is a political scientist based in Notre Dame 
(for a selection see Philpott, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009, 2012).
We call this the programmatic approach because of its advocacy. The thrust to the ap-
proach is that religion places a natural value on reconciliation, encourages its outwork-
ing in ways that form the crux of transitional justice practices, like apology, forgiveness, 
and empathy toward former enemies, and, in respecting justice, religion helps societies 
emerging out of conϐlict with the recovery of truth and the management of divided 
memories. Philpott, as the best representative of the approach, describes with evidence 
from around the globe just what important inϐluence religion can have; and the exam-
ples are drawn from all the world religions (for example, Philpott, 2007a, pp. 184-187). 
For all this effort, however, there is no theorisation of the relationship or any conceptual 
mapping that elaborates on the relationship so that we might understand what it is 
about religion that makes it useful in the transitional justice ϐield. With the exception 
of the observation that religion has its greatest effect in transitional justice only when 
institutionally autonomous from the state, we do not told how religion works to this 
end. Advocacy, of course, tends to be like that. In what follows an attempt is made to 
conceptualise the relationship in such a way as to make it clear what it is about religion 
that can sometimes lend it great import in transitional justice, and sometimes not, ena-
bling us to see when its role might be championed or avoided. We are, in the terms of 
this paper, being programmatic but with reservations, and suggest that like the neutral 
approach the programmatic one comes in two forms, an optimistic and a realist version.
A realist model for understanding religion and transitional justice
To begin to understand the role of religion in transitional justice we need to distinguish 
two aspects to the relationship. The role of religion in transitional justice varies by the 
kind of religious input and the type of transitional justice intervention. We can distin-
guish these brieϐly as the foundation blocks to our model. 
80
Con?lict Studies Quarterly
In terms of religious input, this can vary signiϐicantly. One way to distinguish religious 
inputs is to differentiate in terms of religious values, doctrine, organisation and per-
sonnel. Religious input can thus involve merely the use of vague religious principles 
and rhetoric as mobilisation and legitimation strategies. Examples of this are the idea 
of Christian ‘love’ used as a pillar for reconciliation between victim and perpetrator 
(notably Ure, 2008), search for the spiritual roots to restorative justice or the use of 
Christian values to motivate truth recovery (notably Archbishop Tutu’s Christian ap-
proach to his chairing of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission). The 
various activities of religious and faith-based NGOs, churches and para-church organi-
sations in peacebuilding and reconciliation constitute one of the more obvious forms 
of religious input, emphasised strongly in Smock’s special report on faith-based NGOs 
(2001). Input can also be more individualised, simply referring to the activities of key 
religious personnel, acting as particular role models of reconciliation, forgiveness or 
hope, a number of which are collated by Little (2007) and Gopin (2012), or when act-
ing in concert as a signiϐicant collective group, as emphasised in Brewer, Higgins and 
Teeney’s analysis of key church ϐigures in Northern Ireland’s peace process (2011). 
Another form of religious input is inter-faith dialogue to assist in relations between 
the three Abrahamic faiths, where various forms of doctrine in each are explored for 
their common Abrahamic core as the basis for dialogue. 
Some of these forms of religious input utilise the special expertise of religious actors, 
or are exclusively religious in content, but others put religious actors and resources as 
only one amongst many secular possibilities, to be used as best ϐit the requirements. In 
this latter regard, religious inputs can compete with secular ones – religious and faith 
– based NGOs with human rights groups, women’s groups and the rest, and religious 
values and doctrine can compete with moral frameworks that are secular. In some inputs 
therefore we see religion working to its strengths, in areas where there is relevance, 
expertise, useful contacts, powerful leverage and experience, in others it confuses and 
confounds the problem, perhaps with religious actors and NGOs simply getting in the 
way as well-meaning but naive amateurs. This suggests that religious inputs need to 
be carefully and strategically planned to see where they can best make a difference, 
rather than just thrown in regardless out of wish for religious actors to be seen to do 
something. Where religious inputs are appropriately placed, it follows there should be 
no hostility from competing contributors to the intrusion of religion. 
The key problems around religious inputs are therefore twofold: determining which 
religious inputs are most appropriate; and, where thought to be so, trying to persuade 
the competing contributors not to go-it-alone but to develop fruitful collaboration be-
tween religious and non-religious inputs.
Distinguishing between kinds of religious input is not the only way to unpack the rela-
tionship between religion and transitional justice, the other is by the kind of transitional 
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justice intervention in which religion gets involved. Interventions vary, such as truth 
recovery, managing the past, new forms of memory work, assisting in the social rein-
tegration of ex-combatants, work with victims and the like, reparations and so on. We 
might refer to these as ways of transitional justice intervention. In one sense religion 
might be thought of as a synthesising and encompassing ‘sacred canopy’ hanging over 
all of society, competent to work in every ϐield of transitional justice, from peacemak-
ing to prisoners. The programmatic and pioneering ambitions of Philpott veer toward 
this position. He sees a very broad role for religion in transitional justice, mentioning 
reconciliation, forgiveness, truth commissions, trials, reparations, apologies, trauma 
relief, conϐlict resolution and peacebuilding (see especially, Philpott, 2007a).
However, the notion that religion is a sacred canopy with the competence to intervene 
in all walks of life is not a view that can be sustained in late modernity. Brewer’s ap-
proach to the role of religion in transitional justice, for example, is more circumspect, 
seeing particular areas of the social peace process where religion is better suited than 
others, particularly in respect to truth recovery (see Brewer, 2010, p. 60) and work with 
prisoners (see for example, Brewer, Higgins and Teeney, 2011, pp. 64-67). The role of 
the churches in ‘local’ bottom-up truth recovery processes, for example, is especially 
noteworthy as alternatives to state-led, top-down processes, which are often in the 
control of the former regime, as occurred frequently in Latin America (see, for example, 
Rios, 2015). This happened, of course, precisely in societies where the Catholic Church 
was the dominant and largest civil society group, and the only civil society group with 
the authority, legitimacy and relative political safety to conduct rival truth recovery 
procedures in opposition to the state. Religion was not an input into truth recovery in 
Argentina or Rwanda (as noted by Philpott, 2007a, pp. 104-105). In the latter case this 
is because religious actors were eager participants in the slaughter, leaving the churches 
and religious-based NGOs with no credibility in calling for truth recovery afterwards 
and much to hide from any truth recovery process. The context to the intervention is 
therefore critical to the feasibility of a religious input in particular modes of interven-
tion; and clearly, in addition to its obvious social structural dimensions, ‘context’ here 
includes the nature and history of the conϐlict itself. 
This brief discussion suggests three variables are critical to understanding the potential 
contribution of religion to transitional justice – the type of religious input, the mode of 
intervention, and the context to the relationship, as represented in Figure 1.
This conceptual mapping implies that religion has a role in transitional justice when – 
and only when – the relevant types of input can be distinguished, the appropriate forms 
of input identiϐied and the best modes of intervention speciϐied, for the context in which 
it is occurring. This schema suggests there will be contexts in which religious inputs 
ought to occur when they currently do not, and contexts where the input is inappropri-
ate or ought not to occur at all. Even enthusiasts who adopt what we call the optimistic 
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programmatic approach, where religious inputs are thought feasible in all modes of 
transitional justice and in all contexts, still ought to have the realism to caution religious 
actors to garner the information to understand which kind of religious input is needed, 
and what is the best mode of intervention to make for the speciϐic context if it is not to 
backϐire or prove counterproductive. In the section that follows, we apply the model to 
a particular case, ex-combatants in Northern Ireland’s conϐlict, in which the conceptual 
distinction between input, intervention and context is used to advocate the more realist 
approach to religious contributions to transitional justice. It offers a counterweight to 
unbridled optimism, emphasising the strengths and weaknesses of religion.
Applying the model to religion and transitional justice in Northern Ireland
This conceptual map helps us understand the strengths and weaknesses of the role of 
religion in transitional justice in Northern Ireland and provides the means by which 
we can evaluate its relevance to ex-combatants’ transition to non-violence. 
The schema suggests the need to have the most effective balance between input and 
intervention for the context at hand. Dealing ϐirst with context, at ϐirst sight, it might look 
as if the context in Northern Ireland rules out religion playing any role in transitional 
justice. The nature and history of the conϐlict gave it a religious hue as a result of the 
ethno-religious boundary markers of the groups involved, even though the substance 
of the conϐlict was thoroughly political. Wider social structural conditions ensured the 
survival of ancient colonial divisions, reproducing two cultural and political identities 
that encouraged and reinforced separation and separateness between the religious 
groups through forms of social distance, residential and educational segregation and 
political conϐlict. The context therefore made religion part of the problem, making it 
difϐicult for it to be seen as part of the solution. 
Intervention 
Input  Context    
Figure 1: Religion and transitional justice
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This was not improved by the actions of the institutional churches themselves, which 
compounded the difϐiculties of the context. The inability of the institutional church to 
become involved in the peace process in active and overt ways, outside weak inputs 
like ritualised forms of condemnation of the violence, earned the institutional church 
no legitimacy that might by popular acclaim and political pressure pull the institu-
tional church into intervening in the post-conϐlict public arena to lead debates about 
transitional justice issues around human rights, truth recovery, victimhood, forgive-
ness, hope, memory, righteous anger, victims and the like. Faith-based interventions 
were made by religious independents, mavericks and individuals working outside the 
institutional churches in religious orders and para-church organisations. Individuals 
from the mainstream churches gravitated to spaces of religious peacebuilding that were 
outside the control of conservative church hierarchies. Their inputs were limited by the 
lack of ofϐicial status and authority that marked the interventions.
This constrained religious actors in their interventions, resulting in an almost exclu-
sive focus on reconciliation work to improve relations between individual Catholics 
and Protestants. Reconciliation work is commendable. It offered a bright light in the 
midst of the darkness of barbarous violence. But this form of intervention prevented 
religious actors from dealing with other key issues in the transition from conϐlict to 
peace. Philpott (2007a, pp. 104-105), for example, notes the peculiarity of Northern 
Ireland for the failure of the churches to push for truth recovery processes. There is no 
lobby by them in the public sphere for a truth recovery process, and no involvement 
of the institutional church or religious actors in the community-led local processes set 
up as an alternative. Philpott explains this by the resistance of the British state to es-
tablish a formal process, although there was religious involvement in the government’s 
Consultative Group on the Past (but its report, ironically, has slipped from history). This 
does not, however, absolve the institutional churches or individual religious actors from 
undertaking or pushing for community-led and local based truth recovery projects in 
combination with human rights groups and lobbyists. 
In fact, there is no intervention by religious actors, faith-based NGOs, para-church 
groups, or the institutional church in any of the arenas which demarcate transitional 
justice studies. The context might be said to rule it out. Ambivalent about overt involve-
ment in the political conϐlict, the institutional churches do not know how to intervene 
in the peace process. The religious hue to the conϐlict made them withdraw from the 
public sphere to avoid making matters worse, so they restricted themselves to the one 
input they felt this religious colouring made relevant – reconciliation between Catholics 
and Protestants – completely overlooking the social structural conditions that made 
these relations abnormal in the ϐirst place. This even included a failure to input into 
the social gospel in working class neighbourhoods where violence was embedded. This 
kind of context makes religious contributions to transitional justice very difϐicult, but 
there is no reason why it should have ruled rule it out altogether. This brings us to the 
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former combatants in Northern Ireland. They are important to the wider literature on 
religion and transitional justice because this was the one arena where religion was 
heavily involved in Northern Ireland’s peace process. 
Religion and ex-combatants
The human rights tradition of transitional justice studies in Northern Ireland com-
pletely overlooks religion in its consideration of ex-combatants (see for example Shirlow, 
Tonge, McAuley and McGlynn, 2010). But advocates of the contribution of religion to 
transitional justice neglect it too. The judgement by Philpott (2007a, pp. 195-196) that 
Northern Ireland is a contrary case to the litany of places he lists as evidencing positive 
contributions, can only be sustained by neglecting the churches’ work with prisoners, 
their families and ex-combatants in Northern Ireland. This is an input especially relevant 
to the calling of religious actors because of the biblical injunctions within Christianity 
to pastor to prisoners. And it is an arena for intervention which is easily able to exploit 
the expertise, contacts and familiarity garnered for religious actors through the system 
of prison chaplains, prison services and religious literature available inside, as well as 
the accessibility of jail inmates to religious actors and prisoners’ potential receptivity 
to religious contemplation and reϐlection. Finally, the context – one of prolonged and 
bitter armed struggle – made this kind of input and intervention highly relevant for 
peace, since the imprimatur of ex-combatants and prisoners is critical to any deal and 
their own personal transformation from violence to peace is a measure of the likely 
success in negotiating one.
In this regard, the religious independents, mavericks and faith-based NGOs and para-
church groups were very good in terms of contributing to transitional justice. The inputs 
took many forms, ranging from establishing dialogue with the paramilitary groups, act-
ing as back channels for communication between the paramilitary groups and a host of 
other parties interested in ending the violence (other religious groups, political parties, 
government ministers, even with the secret service), facilitating political discussions 
between politicians and the political leaders of paramilitary groups to draw them away 
from an exclusively military strategy, hosting debates about political blueprints and 
running between interlocutors testing out various formulations of the wording, meeting 
with political prisoners and combatants inside the jails, assisting their families on the 
outside, and simple pastoral work in which they put themselves alongside prisoners 
and paramilitaries alike.
Some of these inputs were very effective indeed, especially back channel dialogue, but if 
we restrict ourselves to ex-combatants, the effectiveness of the interventions they made 
was constrained by the context of armed struggle. This context was an enablement to 
their inputs but a constraint on the effectiveness of the interventions. While there was 
every prospect for a signiϐicant input for religion in transitional justice interventions 
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with ex-combatants, this did not happen. Let us ϐirst show see why the potential for 
religious input was so high. 
The context was an enablement to religious inputs in that Northern Ireland is peculiar 
in having a strong religious content to processes of cultural and political identity forma-
tion, ensuring that, personal faith or not, religion was taken seriously and was a reality 
that ex-combatants could not evade. In our research amongst a sample of ex-combatants 
we discovered two groups, those with and those without personal faith. With respect 
to those with faith, our sample of ex-combatants showed no greater tendency to belief 
than the general public and those who believed did so for the very same sets of rea-
sons as anyone else. The evidence of personal faith amongst some former combatants 
means that combatant groups were not monolithic but extremely diverse in terms of 
their religious outlook. Combatant groups contained with them the array of religious 
commitment and unbelief of the wider society generally. It was noticeable amongst the 
non-believers that although they lacked personal faith, religion was still tied up with 
their cultural and political identity. Combatants emerged from and remained embed-
ded in Northern Irish society, the result of social structural processes of cultural and 
political identity formation that religion represented. This means that armed struggle 
was not a poison that somehow infected society from the outside, or represented the 
actions of a small number of faithless, psychopathic killers; it was embedded in the very 
same cultural and political processes of identity formation that reproduced religious 
observance and identiϐication in others. Religion was relevant to all the ex-combatants 
in our sample therefore, but in different ways. It is for this reason that we claim that the 
context enabled and facilitated religious inputs into transitional justice work with ex-
combatants, giving the prospect for religion to have a major role in transitional justice. 
Why did this not happen? While there was no evidence of direct religious motivation to 
violence amongst our respondents, religion offered little constraint on them either. If 
religion did not offer a clear and unambiguous motivation to war, religion offered little 
constraint preventing ex-combatants’ take-up of arms or much effective encourage-
ment to them to desist. In relation to their personal transition to non-violence, religion 
tended to conϐirm the commitment to peace that they had already developed as part 
of political and personal decision-making. Religion was at the heart of the cultures 
and the national identities of the communities that were perceived to be under threat, 
which restricted is capacity to prevent ex-combatants taking up arms. The decision to 
become a combatant for those with personal faith posed special dilemmas of course, 
giving them a burden of conscience that obligated a narrative that was very personal, 
even intimate, revealing a high level of reϐlexivity about moral issues. This was particu-
larly so for Loyalist converts to evangelicalism inside the prisons. However, we argue 
that the prison experience was more important in the transition to non-violence for 
believers than any consideration of religion alone. Even the conversion experience for 
Loyalists-turned-evangelicals was inϐluenced by prison. Religion caused fewer pangs of 
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conscience than one might have expected for those ex-combatants with personal faith 
because their sense of cultural and political identity furnished a moral framework in 
favour of armed struggle that negated the effects of personal faith in mitigated against it. 
Religion and the prison experience, however, interacted with each other in contradictory 
ways. On the one hand, prison entailed experiences conducive to faith. It was brutalis-
ing, it interrupted individuals’ lives by separating them from the outside, it gave ample 
time for reϐlection and debate, and it brought people into contact with religious mes-
sages which it was more difϐicult for them to avoid than when living on the outside. As 
a close-knit community, prison promoted a religious ‘contagion’ among some prisoners, 
something clearly evident in the stories of conversion, participation in the communal 
Rosaries and so on. For those with personal faith, the prison experience enhanced 
their commitment – an enhancement that enabled religious conversions amongst the 
formerly non-religious. Conversely, prison involved experiences and inϐluences which 
were detrimental to faith. It gave the opportunity for political education which in many 
cases led Republicans away from religion. The close fellowship between combatants 
could deepen political resolve, encouraging the encounter with the un-thinking, taken-
for-granted religiosity of their upbringing. Separated from the communal and family 
structures that made observance ‘natural’ for Catholics, some Republican prisoners 
lost faith. Loyalists never experienced community life in their neighbourhoods as the 
same constraint pushing them to observance, but such is the importance of community 
and family structures in the transmission of religion across the generations, that some 
Loyalist respondents noted the impact of the conversion of their parents, family and 
friends on their own encounter with God. In one case we see religion as a resource used 
to make sense of – and change – life on the outside (loss of faith and observance), in the 
other, religion is impacted by what happens outside and used as a resource to make 
sense of – and change – life on the inside (by means of religious conversion).
It is clear that religion was a key coping strategy to help respondents deal with the harsh-
ness and monotony of life inside jail. In this regard, the religious upbringing of many 
combatants was a signiϐicant factor regardless of whether or not they now considered 
themselves religious. A religious morality and sensibility that had lain dormant since 
their childhood was reawakened through the prison experience to show itself in either 
a temporary reinvigorated religiosity or religious conversion. Religious conversion was 
more likely to occur in those inmates with few other coping strategies. This reinforces 
the importance of political education for Republican prisoners as an alternative cop-
ing mechanism, the effects of which was often to cause them to question the ‘natural 
Catholicity’ of their Irishness, leading to a loss of faith. And the tendency of Loyalist 
prisoners toward using bodybuilding, gym and steroids, building up the body not the 
soul, as a coping strategy, ensured that Loyalist religious converts were a minority of 
the inmate population. This is not to suggest that Loyalist religious converts became 
religious merely as an alternative to bodybuilding. Religious conversion gave them a 
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sense of power, even mastery, over the prison experience in precisely the same way 
politics did for Republicans. Witnessing and preaching were a form of status and power 
inside prison and a way of transcending its brutalisation.
For these reasons we are right to argue that religion was an enablement for ex-combat-
ants. But the ex-combatants also faced the institutional churches’ opposition to armed 
struggle. The churches offered a cold climate for ex-combatants. Ex-combatants were 
free with their criticisms of the institutional church, despite the level of personal faith 
some displayed and the positive interaction most of them had with individual church-
men and women inside the prisons or on the streets. The institutional church rejected 
them, let them down, and failed to systematically support their political choice, ϐirst 
to take up and then to give up the armed struggle. In Republican views of the Catholic 
Church, there were a number of interrelated criticisms. There was the perception that 
the church was irrelevant to improving the difϐicult situation the Catholic community 
found itself in at the start ‘the Troubles’. It was theologically conservative, offering no 
hope for people to improve their lot, ignored the clear Biblical bias towards the poor 
and oppressed, and was politically fearful of criticising the British state. Despite the 
close-knit parish system, Republican ex-combatants felt it was distant from the common 
people and failed to identify with their experiences as Republicans. While it is clearly 
the case that the overwhelming majority of Catholics did not follow our respondents 
into the armed struggle, and the greatest number in the congregation needed help in 
dealing with the very real effects of the military campaign that our respondents helped 
to cause, if the Catholic Church was to make a difference to the level of violence, it needed 
to engage with Sinn Féin as much as the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party 
and to dialogue with combatants as much as those in the pews who resisted violence. 
Brave individuals within the Catholic Church did this, the institutional church did not. 
The sense of distance from the institutional church was perhaps even greater for Loyalist 
ex-combatants. Interviewees thought the Protestant churches should have had a greater 
role in both restraining Loyalist violence and mobilising on behalf of embattled and 
impoverished Loyalist communities. The mainstream Protestant churches did little to 
advance the social position of Loyalists in underprivileged neighbourhoods and their 
middle-class notions of respectability prevented them from developing the kind of 
close relationships with paramilitaries from which political dialogue, back channel 
communication and eventually peace grew. Evangelicals stole a march on the main-
stream churches in this respect and where Loyalists express positive assessments of 
the churches, they refer to the prophetic presence of individual evangelicals and social 
gospel activists who were dialoguing with the paramilitaries and trying to address the 
poverty and disadvantage in Loyalist neighbourhoods. 
The mediation of religion in the choice between armed struggle and non-violence there-
fore is not simple or direct. Catholic ex-combatants largely lost their faith in prison (or 
88
Con?lict Studies Quarterly
before) and found a church unable to pastor to their immediate anxieties and concerns 
when thinking about the morality of armed struggle. Those who retained their faith re-
ported religion to be secondary to what was already a developing political and personal 
momentum toward non-violence. Religion rationalised a decision already made. For 
Loyalists, conversion to evangelicalism simultaneously formed and reϐlected their transi-
tion to a peace strategy in the working class neighbourhoods where the paramilitaries 
held sway, regardless of Loyalists’ personal faith. Putting this another way, the growing 
commitment of evangelical pastors in hard-line areas to a peace strategy helped Loyalist 
prisoners converted to evangelicalism conϐirm their decision against armed struggle, a 
conversion experience that was itself not largely motivated by contempt at a military 
strategy but by a series of serendipitous factors related to the prison experience. 
The signiϐicant prospect there was for religious input into transitional justice interven-
tions with ex-combatants in Northern Ireland as a result of the context of the conϐlict, 
was in effect stymied by that very context. It was a context in which the institutional 
churches were frightened of working closely with the ex-prisoners, in part because of 
disgust at their choice of armed struggle, as well as fear that doing so would be construed 
as offering religious support for it, but it was also in part the result of the institutional 
churches’ own inability to become actively involved in transitional justice. It was left 
to religious mavericks, independents and individuals to dialogue with ex-combatants 
and the paramilitary organisations. This limited the nature and extent of the religious 
inputs because of the lack of ofϐicial authority. Religion was ambivalent. In a setting of 
ethno-religious conϐlict like Northern Ireland, religious extremism helped construct 
antagonistic identities, which it was difϐicult for more liberal forms of religion to under-
cut. Ex-combatants were not all irreligious. Some in our study had personal faith, and 
some saw in a cultural religious mythology weak justiϐications for violence, but none 
experienced their faith or the institutional churches to which they either devoutly or 
nominally belonged as an encouragement to their choice of violence; nor an encourage-
ment in their transition to non-violence. The ϐirst might be construed the institutional 
churches’ greatest success in Northern Ireland, the second their greatest weakness.
Conclusion
We have tried in this paper to give an overview of a relatively new sub-ϐield of tran-
sitional justice studies, and to structurally locate it as part of wider trends, as well as 
report on an empirical case that illuminates it. Many themes have been woven together 
but the argument is simple and clear. The growing interest in religion and transitional 
justice studies needs to be located in a broader intellectual shift, the emergence of re-
ligious peacebuilding, whose formation in the current of post-Cold War triumphalism 
in the United States has made it a programmatic approach that is hugely optimistic. 
This contrasts with the earlier approaches in which religion was recognised as part of 
the environment affecting transitional justice but was largely neutral and minimal. The 
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programmatic approach enlightens our understanding of transitional justice by making 
us aware of the role of religion, but it is atheoretical and in need of conceptual mapping 
to enable us to see what it is speciϐically about religion that can impact on transitional 
justice and in what speciϐic modes of transitional justice practice. But it is in need of 
a second corrective. Religious contributions to transitional justice can be exaggerated 
and are not always positive. The conceptual mapping outlined here draws a distinction 
between three aspects of the relationship between religion and transitional justice – re-
ligious inputs, modes of transitional justice intervention and context – whose interplay 
means we need to approach the relationship with realism rather than optimism. The 
case of ex-combatants in Northern Ireland illustrates the strengths and weaknesses 
of the relationship in a context where we might have expected it to ϐlourish. Models 
are only as good as the empirical insights they illuminate. We suggest that the model 
outlined here proffers a conceptual map by which we can better plot the ambivalent 
contribution religion makes to transitional justice, meaning that optimistic program-
matic accounts of this relationship need to be tempered with healthy doses of realism. 
This contribution, however, should not be ignored or denied despite its challenge to 
traditional human rights approaches to transitional justice. What we have here called 
the programmatic realist approach offers in our view the best balance when delineating 
religious contributions to transitional justice. 
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